In reflecting on a post by Dave from about a week and a half ago, along with an email from avid reader Paul Mortensen, the question arises: is poverty a moral or a natural evil? I’ve previously argued that poverty is evil, indeed a universal, collective sin (see here, here, and here). This argument seems to presuppose that poverty is a moral, rather than a natural, evil.

The distinction between natural and moral evil is drawn from moral philosophy; in Sterling McMurrin’s words (see pages 96-97 of the Signature Books edition of his essay on Mormon theology), natural evil is “the evil that the world does,” while moral evil is “the evil that men do.” Wikipedia offers a somewhat more legalistic definition, suggesting that moral evil “is the result of any morally negative event caused by the intentional action or inaction of an agent, such as a person,” whereas natural evil arises when “a bad event occurs without the intervention of an agent.” This post will ask: 1) Is poverty a natural or a moral evil? 2) Is inequality a natural or a moral evil? 3) When is inaction against evil justifiable?

Poverty is a natural evil if it does not result from human actions, but rather is a consequence of the simple workings of nature. For example, in a community on a desert island with no means of communication with the outside world, poverty is a natural evil; it simply results from a paucity of resources, not from human decision-making. However, when turning to the globally integrated community of humans, it is implausible for Latter-day Saints to argue that poverty is a natural evil rather than a product of human decision-making. After all, we have a canonical text which tells us that “the earth is full; and there is enough and to spare” (D&C 104: 17). If this revealed statement is correct, then resource shortages can never be blamed on nature. Instead, they must be the product of human institutions–i.e., poverty must necessarily be a moral, rather than a natural evil.

A major component of poverty in the modern world involves the distribution of wealth; while the world as a whole certainly has enough economic production to lift most people out of poverty, the resulting wealth is instead often directed to other purposes: leisure goods, military expenses, space exploration, entertainment, etc. These latter goods are overwhelmingly enjoyed by those who have resources and not by the poor. (This generalization even includes military protection; most poor people live in countries with relatively weak militaries, where borders are generally insecure and intervention by more powerful countries cannot be prevented.) Is economic inequality of this kind evil? Joseph Smith’s revelations define it as such:

But it is not given that one man should possess that which is above another, wherefore the world lieth in sin (D&C 49:20).

Nevertheless, in your temporal things you shall be equal, and this not grudgingly, otherwise the abundance of the manifestations of the Spirit shall be withheld (D&C 70:14).

Also of note in this context is the fact that 4 Nephi defines the end of the period of social bliss after Christ’s visit among the Nephites in terms of the reemergence of economic inequality:

And now, in this two hundred and first year there began to be among them those who were lifted up in pride, such as the wearing of costly apparel, and all manner of fine pearls, and of the fine things of the world. And from that time forth they did have their goods and their substance no more common among them. And they began to be divided into classes; and they began to build up churches unto themselves to get gain, and began to deny the true church of Christ. (4 Nephi 1:24-26)

So economic inequality is clearly evil. Furthermore, it immediately follows that inequality is a moral, rather than a natural evil. After all, inequality can be remedied by human action; something as simple as the rich giving a lot of resources to the poor can be sufficient, or more complex social institutions have also proven effective in reducing inequality and–simultaneously–eliminating poverty. (While there are exceptions such as Cuba, for the most part, there is a strong cross-national correlation between lower levels of inequality and lower levels of poverty.) Hence, at the very least, human inaction is responsible for inequality, which is therefore a moral evil. However, it is also true that human economic institutions undergird the existing system of inequality, meaning that human actions–and not just inaction–produce this evil.

In light of my conviction that both poverty and inequality are moral evils, which can be remedied by changes in human institutions, why am I an academic and not a revolutionary? Am I justified in pursuing this life, rather than trying to organize some kind of global movement to overthrow the current system?

In fact, I think I am justified, for the simple reason that I can’t find anything more productive to do. In my current life, I can raise these issues online and (in specific ways) with students; I can also give to church charities and other development efforts. But, more importantly, I can’t think of another way I could currently act to the evils of poverty and inequality that wouldn’t create other evils. At the end of the day, the fact that something is evil does not immediately justify any and all possible actions to resolve that evil; only if the action would resolve the evil in question without producing other, larger evils, is it justified. If the hearts and minds of a sufficient number of people can be won over, poverty and inequality can certainly be resolved without violence and without totalitarianism; the best role I can see for myself at present is in that struggle to win hearts and minds.